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John: Are Physicians Exempt From Testifying?
BENCH AND BAR
ARE PHYSICIANS EXEMPT FROM TESTIFYING?
Is a physician or surgeon, under the common law, or under
the statutes of West Virginia, exempt from testifying as to professional communications of patients?
The scope of this question makes it unnecessary to hark back
to the origin of the doctrine of "privileged communications".
The inadmissibility of certain kinds of evidence denominated
"privileged", rests on grounds of public policy. Greater mischief
may result from admission than from rejection of such evidence.'
As illustrations, the interest of government in state secrets, and
in the detection and prevention of crime, imposes secrecy as to
communications whose revelation may tend to work injury to the
public. "The proper administration of the law ordinarily forbids
requiring an officer to disclose his source of information regarding
a crime." 2 Just respect for the family relation bars disclosure of
'commuications between husband and wife. Thze professional
relation between attorney and client seals the lips of the attorney,
out of regard for the interest of justice and to facilitate its dispatch. The church affords another immunity; for even in the
Middle Ages, the Roman and the French laws permitted the guilty
conscience to seek consolation in confession, without fear of revelation of guilt in the courts. Under the milder British rule, the
common law merely excused the clergy from presenting the
offender. But in all other respects, says Greenleaf, the clergyman,
"is left to the full operation of the rules of the common law, by
which he is bound to testify in such cases as any other person
when duly summoned."
"Neither is this protection extended to medical persons, in
regard to information which they have acquired confidentially,
by attending in their professional characters." 8
Throughout West Virginia it is not unusual to hear physicians and surgeons assert immunity from testifying as to professional communications received by them in the treatment of
patients. A doctor often declines to become a witness, on the
ground that the facts revealed to hini by a patient are "privileged
communications" which he cannot reveal except by his patient's
consent. Fom the vantage point of such exem-tion, expert witnesses bargain for fees. Suits for damages under insurance policies,
211

GwENLA oN EviDEcE (16th ed. 1899) § 236.
State v. Paun, 109 W. Va. 606, 155 S. E. 656 (1930).

3 GaF~mFAr ON EvMEiOE § 247a.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1935

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 3 [1935], Art. 18

WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
and actions for automobile accidents and for injuries received by
employees in industry make special examination and consultation
by experts desirable as protection against collusion. And this
precautionary measure has been pursued under the assumption
that the secrets of professional disclosures are protected by rules
governing the admission of evidence.
Long before the Legislature of West Virginia passed any
statute relating to the exemption of medical men, New York
adopted a provision in these words:
"No person duly authorized to practice physic or surgery,
shall be allowed to disclose any information which he may
have acquired in attending a patient in a confidential character".4
In construing this statute, the Supreme Court of New York
said, "The privilege is undoubtedly that of the party (patient),
and not that of the witness (doctor) ".r

The Virginia Codes of 1849 and 1860 allow no exemption to
physicians and surgeons. Mayo, after speaking of the strict rule
against disclosures by attorneys, says:
"This privilege does not extend to other professional persons.
All other professional men, whether clergymen, physicians or
surgeons, are bound to disclose the matters confided to them".'
The West Virginia Code of 1868 forbade the examination of
one spouse against the other, except in actions or suits between
them; but it enumerated no exemptions to or inhibitions against
either attorneys or doctors testifying as to professional secrets.
But in 1863, for the first time, the Legislature of West Virginia embodied in the justices' eode7 (since designated as Chapter
50 of the General Code), the following classes of persons as incompetent to testify: (1) persons of unsound mind and children;
(2) husband and wife as to communications between them; (3)
attorney and client as to professional secrets; and (4) ministers,
clergymen and priests concerning confessions.
Again the Legislature of 1872-3 recodified the laws relating
to justices and constables, but omitted the four above-mentioned
classes incompetent to testify.8 The Legislature of 1881 again
revised the justices' code and restored the provision of 1863, with
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the qualification that an attorney may testify with his client's
consent; and to these it added a fifth incompetent class, namely:
"A physician or surgeon, without his patient's consent, concerning any communication made to him by his patient, which
was necessary to enable him to prescribe and treat the ease.'' D
These acts, neither in title nor body, express the object or
purpose of making them applicable in any cases except those before justices of the peace. The Constitution, Article VI, Section
30, requires that the object of every act "shall be expressed in
the title". The title of the Act of 1872-3 reads: "An act to reduce
into one the laws defining the jurisdiction, powers and duties of
justices of the peace and constables." And the Act of 1881 is
equally limited in purpose to the powers and procedure before
justices.
In similar language the exemption accorded to the medical
profession has been carried into later codes, now appearing as
Section 10, Article 6, of Chapter 50 of the Official Code.
In the statute excluding testimony as to personal transactions
with a decedent, there is a proviso allowing a physician who is a
defendant in a wrongful death action to testify as to medicine or
treatment given, but not as to conversation with the deceased. 10
Another statute of minor importance makes a practitioner of
chiropractic incompetent as a medical witness in personal injury
cases."' Except for these enactments, which plainly have small
bearing upon the subject of privileged communications, the Code
is silent with respect to extending the privilege to communications
with physicians for purposes of litigation in tribunals other than
magistrates' courts. Since communications with other classes of
persons are privileged, the class under consideration must be taken
to be denied that treatment by implication. No authority has been
discovered, which would shake this conclusion.
Thus it appears that, in cases originating before a justice or
on appeal, a medical man may invoke the rule exonerating him
from testifying, only upon proof of his patient's consent; but no
common law rule or statute of the state may be invoked in any
other case, whether with or without his patient's consent. Unless
the evidence sought to be adduced is inadmissible on recognized
grounds touching public policy or public morals or the adminis9W.Va. Acts
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tration of justice, a physician or surgeon may be called to testify
in response to the same sort of process, and in the same manner
and extent as to facts, as ordinary witnesses. But in the capacity
of an expert, he may bargain and dictate his own terms before
engaging in consultation, diagnosis or treatment.
WnELiAm S. JoHN.

SHOULD THE EVIDENCE IN A CRIMINAL CASE BE
GIVEN TO THE PUBLIC IN ADVANCE OF
THE TRIAL BEFORE A JURY?
The slogan carried on the first page of one of the country's
leading newspapers, viz: "All the News That's Fit to Print", suggests some comments upon the growing practice among newspapers
all over the country when a major crime has been committed, of
sensational proportions, printing, for the general public to read,
every clue and every item of evidence in detail, with the names
and addresses of the witnesses, as rapidly as gathered by investigating officers, in advance of the trial of the case by a jury-a
practice, in my humble opinion, highly detrimental to the public
interest.
There are some reasons supporting this view. In the first
place, let us suppose that no one has been arrested and charged
with the crime. The result is to acquaint the guilty party, whoever
he may be, with all the clues and evidence gathered by detectives
and law enforcement officers, with the names and addresses of the
witnesses who are expected to testify in court for the State.
It must be assumed that the guilty party will see and read
the newspapers and so become fully informed of the progress
made towards his detection and arrest. -He is thus fully prepared,
either to disappear, entailing great expense and delay in his
ultimate arrest, and seriously jeopardizing the chances of his ultimate conviction, by the delay, or he may conclude to stand his
ground and set about the business of destroying the State's case,
by threatening or bribing material witnesses and so causing them
to disappear, or develop at the trial such lapses of memory as to
destroy the value of their testimony; or, if all other means fail, a
very material witness may be "taken for a ride." All that has
been said above, applies with equal force to one who has been
arrested and indicted and who has been able to procure bail.
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